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Ming Cao(a) and Sergio Grammatico(b)
Abstract— We consider the charge scheduling coordination
of a fleet of plug-in electric vehicles, developing a hybrid
decision-making framework for efficient and profitable usage
of the distribution grid. Each charging dynamics, affected by
the aggregate behavior of the whole fleet, is modelled as an
inter-dependent, mixed-logical-dynamical system. The coordi-
nation problem is formalized as a generalized mixed-integer
aggregative potential game, and solved via semi-decentralized
implementation of a sequential best-response algorithm that
leads to an approximated equilibrium of the game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) represent a promising
alternative to the conventional fuel-based transportation [1].
However, they require a “smart” charge/discharge coordi-
nation to prevent undesired electricity demand peaks and
congestion in the low-voltage distribution grid [2], [3].
Indeed, a fleet of PEVs can serve as a mobile extension of the
grid, mitigating the intermittent behavior of renewable energy
sources by storing (or providing) energy when the generation
is higher (or lower) than the load demand. These capabilities
are known as “ grid-to-vehicle” (g2v) and “vehicle-to-grid”
(v2g), respectively [4]. In this context, a key role is played
by the “fleet manager” or “aggregator”, which is partially
responsible for providing charging services to the PEVs,
coordinating the charge/discharge schedule to fulfill the
needs of the PEVs owners and (desirably) providing ancillary
services to the distribution system operator [1], [2].
Accordingly, an attracting framework that suitably con-
denses both individual interests and intrinsic limitations
related with the shared facilities is represented by non-
cooperative game theory whose equilibrium solution, for
instance in [5], allows to coordinate the charging of a
population of PEVs in a decentralized fashion with the aim
of filling the night-time valley. A similar non-cooperative
equilibrium problem is addressed in [6] using mean field
game theory, while in [7] the authors generalize the notion
of valley-filling and study a social welfare optimization
problem associated with the charging scheduling, proposing
an asynchronous optimization algorithm. The PEV charging
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coordination game is further developed in [8] by including
the battery degradation cost within the cost function of each
vehicle. More generally, a semi-decentralized coordination
algorithm based on fixed-point operator theory is proposed
in [9], which achieves global exponential convergence to an
aggregative equilibrium, even for large population size, while
a distributed approach based on the progressive second price
auction mechanism has been recently proposed in [10].
However, most of the models adopted in the literature
do not describe the intrinsic discrete operations of each
PEV, e.g., being plugged-in or plugged-out from one of the
available charging points, in g2v or in v2g mode [11], [12],
[13]. The selfish nature of each PEV, which pursues an
economic, possibly profitable, usage of the charging station,
together with the presence of both continuous (amount of
energy charged/discharged) and discrete decision variables
(operating mode) over a certain prediction horizon, motivates
us to model the charge scheduling coordination of the PEVs
as a collection of inter-dependent mixed-integer optimization
problems, where the coupling constraints arise in aggregative
form (§II). In fact, the common electricity price, as well as
the operational limitations of the charging station, e.g., the
number of charging points, directly depend on the overall
behavior of the fleet. We then formulate the coordination
problem as a mixed-integer aggregative game (§III), proving
that it corresponds to a Mixed-Integer Generalized Potential
Game (MI-GPG) [14]. Furthermore, we assume the presence
of an aggregator, i.e., the charging station, that provides the
aggregate information to the fleet and allows to compute
an (approximated) equilibrium of the game by means of
a semi-decentralized implementation of a sequential best-
response algorithm (§IV). Finally, we define the game setup
and the solution algorithm via numerical simulations on an
illustrative scenario (§V).
Notation: B represents the binary set. For vectors
v1, . . . , vN ∈ Rn and I = {1, . . . , N}, the collective strategy
is denoted as v := col((vi)i∈I) = [v>1 , . . . , v
>
N ]
> and
v−i := col((vj)j∈I\{i}) = [v>1 , . . . , v
>
i−1, v
>
i+1, . . . , v
>
N ]
>.
With a slight abuse of notation, we also use v = (vi,v−i).
II. PEVS SCHEDULING AND CHARGE AS A SYSTEM OF
MIXED-LOGICAL-DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
We start by modeling the charge scheduling of a PEV
over a certain prediction horizon by first introducing the
dynamics of the State of Charge (SoC) and the related control
variables, both discrete and continuous. Then, we define the
cost function that each PEV aims to minimize and, by means
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of logical implications, the interactions arising both among
the set of PEVs itself and with the charging station.
A. Decision variables and the SoC dynamics
Let I := {1, . . . , N} be the set indexing a population
of PEVs that share the charging resources on a single
charging station with a finite number of charging points,
over a prediction horizon T := {1, . . . , T}. For each vehicle
i ∈ I, the SoC of its battery at time t ∈ T is denoted by
xi(t) ∈ [0, 1], where xi(t) = 1 represents a fully charged
battery, while xi(t) = 0 a completely discharged one. The
amount of energy exchanged between each vehicle and the
charging station, during the time period t, is denoted by
ui(t) ∈ U := [u, u], u < 0, u > 0. Specifically, ui(t) takes
positive values if vehicle i absorbs power during the time
period t, while negative values if it gives energy back. For
all t ∈ T , we assume the dynamics of the SoC described by
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + biδi(t)ui(t)− (1− δi(t))µi(t), (1)
where bi = ηiCi is a positive parameter which depends on the
efficiency ηi > 0 of the i-th battery and the corresponding
capacity Ci > 0. In (1), δi(t) ∈ B is a scheduling variable
of each vehicle, i.e., δi(t) = 1 if the i-th PEV is connected
to the charging station at time t, 0 otherwise. Within the
dynamics (1), we consider that the SoC of the battery
decreases when the vehicle is actively driving. In fact, if
δi(t) = 0, the SoC decreases according to µi(t) > 0, which
represents the discharge due to the energy consumed while
driving during the time period t ∈ T . Therefore, µi(t) > 0
(driving vehicle) can only affects the SoC when the PEV is
not connected to the grid, i.e., δi(t) = 0. If the vehicle is
not driving during the time period t, then µi(t) = 0.
Thus, over the whole horizon T , each PEV i ∈ I has de-
cision variables ui := col((ui(t))t∈T ), δi := col((δi(t))t∈T )
and controls the SoC, xi := col((xi(t))t∈T ).
B. Cost function
We assume that when the vehicle is connected to the
charging station, it can either acquire energy from the
charging station, or give it back. If the i-th PEV at time
t ∈ T requires power from the charging station, i.e.,
ui > 0, then it faces a cost associated to the purchase
and to the battery degradation. We model the first term
as c(d(t) +
∑
j∈I\{i} u
+
j (t))ui(t), where we assume a fair
electricity market with the cost per energy unit c > 0, the
same for all the PEVs, and u+j (t) := uj(t) if uj(t) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise. The values (d(t))t∈N represent the non-PEV
loads of the network, which is assumed to be a-priori known,
while
∑
i∈I\{i} u
+
i (t) =: ai(u(t)) is the aggregate demand
of energy associated with the set of PEVs at time t. Then, we
assume that the degradation cost associated to the charging
of the battery is proportional to the variation of the energy
exchanged between the PEV and the charging station, i.e.,
ρ+i (ui(t) − ui(t − 1))2, with ρ+i > 0 depending on each
single battery. Therefore, for all t ∈ T and for all i ∈ I, the
cost function associated to the charging phase (g2v) is
Jg2vi (ui(t),u−i(t)) := c(d(t)+ai(u(t)))ui(t)
+ ρ+i (ui(t)− ui(t− 1))2.
Similarly, when the PEV gives energy to the charging
station, i.e., ui(t) < 0, the vehicle-to-grid (v2g) interaction
implies a degradation cost due to the battery discharge,
i.e., ρ−i (ui(t) − ui(t − 1))2, ρ−i > 0. However, this cost
is generally compensated by a reward ri(t)ui(t), for some
given values (ri(t))t∈N, that the PEV receives from the
charging station for actively participating in the scheduling.
Thus, the cost function related with the v2g mode reads as
Jv2gi (ui(t)) := ri(t)ui(t) + ρ
−
i (ui(t)− ui(t− 1))2,
for all t ∈ T and i ∈ I.
Now, we introduce two binary decision variables, i.e.,
δci , δ
d
i ∈ B, which allow to model the mutual actions
of charging/discharging and guarantee that the local cost
function is equal to 0 when ui = 0. They shall satisfy the
next logical implications, for all t ∈ T and for all i ∈ I:
[δci(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [ui(t) ≥ 0], (2)
[δdi (t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [ui(t) ≤ 0]. (3)
Namely, δci(t) (or, equivalently, δ
d
i (t)) is equal to 1 if the
PEV is not discharging (not charging), 0 otherwise. Finally,
for all i ∈ I, the complete cost function reads as follows
Ji(ui, δ
d
i , δ
c
i ,u−i) :=
∑
t∈T J
g2v
i (ui(t),u−i(t))
(
1− δdi (t)
)
+ Jv2gi (ui(t))(1− δci(t)),
(4)
where δci := col((δ
c
i(t))t∈T ) and δ
d
i := col((δ
d
i (t))t∈T ).
C. Local and global constraints
By considering a generic PEV i ∈ I, first we assume that,
for all t ∈ T , it is desired that the corresponding level of
SoC is at least equal to a reference level xrefi (t) ∈ [0, 1], i.e.,
xrefi (t) ≤ xi(t) . (5)
The driving pattern of each PEV limits the possible values
of δi(t). Namely, if µi(t) > 0 then feasible set of δi(t) is
B(t) = 0; otherwise B(t) = B. Thus, this condition translate
in a time varying feasible set B(t) of δi(t).
If δi(t) is left free, it may lead a vehicle to persistently
switch between being connected and unconnected to the grid
among consecutive time intervals. This behaviour is not only
unnatural, but could also lead to a fast degradation of the
battery [15]. To exclude this potential source of damage, we
impose that, if a PEV is plugged-in at a certain time t ∈ T ,
i.e., δi(t − 1) = 0 and δi(t) = 1, then it has to remain
connected to the charging station for at least hi ≤ T, hi ∈ N
consecutive time intervals. Thus, for all i ∈ I and t ∈ T ,
this constraint can be rephrased via the logical implication
[δi(t−1) = 0]∧[δi(t) = 1]⇒ [δi(t+h) = 1, ∀h ≤ hi]. (6)
Next, to exclude that a PEV charges or discharges when it is
plugged-out (i.e., δi(t) = 0), we impose that ui(t) ∈ U(t) :=
[uδi(t), uδi(t)]. Thus, ui(t) = 0 if δi(t) = 0, otherwise ui
takes values in [u, u]. Moreover, to exclude that a vehicle is
plugged-in without being neither charged nor discharged, we
impose that δi(t) = 0 if ui(t) = 0. Thus, the next logical
implication needs to be satisfied for all t ∈ T and i ∈ I:
[ui(t) = 0] ⇐⇒ [δi(t) = 0]. (7)
Successively, due to the intrinsic limitations of the grid
capacity d > 0, we assume that the amount of energy
required in a single time period by both the PEVs and non-
PEV loads cannot be greater than d. This translates into a
constraint on the PEVs total demand, i.e.,
d(t) +
∑
j∈I uj(t) ∈
[
0, d
]
. (8)
Finally, it is natural to assume that the charging station
has a finite number of charging spots, i.e., the number of
vehicles that can charge/discharge at the same time cannot
exceed a finite value v ∈ N. Thus, we impose, for all t ∈ T ,∑
j∈I δj(t) ≤ v . (9)
D. Mixed-integer game formulation
We conclude this section by summarizing a preliminary
formulation of the optimization problem for the scheduling
and charging/discharging of each PEV as follows:
∀i ∈ I :

min
ui,xi,δi,δdi,δ
c
i
Ji(ui, δ
d
i , δ
c
i ,u−i)
s.t. (1), xi(t) ∈ [0, 1],
ui(t) ∈ U(t), δi(t) ∈ B(t),
δci(t), δ
d
i (t) ∈ B,
(2), (3), (5)–(9), ∀t ∈ T .
(G)
We emphasize that several constraints in (G), as well as
the cost function, are either expressed as logical implications,
or directly depend on the evaluation of a logical proposition.
In the next section we translate all these logical implications
into mixed-integer-linear inequalities, hence the problem in
(G) as a (parametric) mixed integer quadratic problem.
III. TRANSLATING THE LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS INTO
MIXED-INTEGER LINEAR CONSTRAINTS
For the sake of clarity, we adopt the same notation used in
[16], [17], i.e., we define several patterns of inequalities that
allow to handle all the constraints. Specifically, given a linear
function f : R→ R, let us define M := maxx∈X f(x), m :=
minx∈X f(x) with X being a compact set. Then, with c ∈ R
and δ ∈ B, a first system S≥ of mixed-integer inequalities
correspond to [δ = 1] ⇐⇒ [f(x) ≥ c], i.e.,
S≥(δ, f(x), c) :=
{
(c−m)δ ≤ f(x)−m
(M − c+ )δ ≥ f(x)− c+ ,
Here  > 0 is a small tolerance beyond which the constraint
is regarded as violated. With the same idea, the following
set of inequalities corresponds to [δ = 1] ⇐⇒ [f(x) ≤ c]:
S≤(δ, f(x), c) :=
{
(M − c)δ ≤M − f(x)
(c+ −m)δ ≥ + c− f(x).
Successively, we define the next block of inequalities,
involving binary variables only, which allow to solve proposi-
tions with logical AND, i.e., [δ = 1] ⇐⇒ [σ = 1]∧[γ = 1]:
S∧(δ, σ, γ) :=

−σ + δ ≤ 0
−γ + δ ≤ 0
σ + γ − δ ≤ 1,
Finally, to recast bilinear terms, i.e., products of binary and
continuous variables, into a mixed-integer linear formulation,
we introduce the following pattern of inequalities.
S⇒(g, f(x), δ) :=
{
mδ ≤ g ≤Mδ
−M(1− δ) ≤ g − f(x) ≤ −m(1− δ)
The latter is equivalent to: [δ = 0] =⇒ [g = 0], while
[δ = 1] =⇒ [g = f(x)].
A. The mixed-integer-linear constraints
The logical implications in (2) and (3) translate into:
S≥(δci(t), ui(t), 0), (10)
S≤(δdi (t), ui(t), 0). (11)
By referring to the SoC dynamics in (1), the bilinear term
uiδi can be handled by following the procedure in [18],
which allows to rewrite it as mixed-integer-linear inequalities
by means of additional auxiliary variables (both real and
binary, [19]). Specifically, we define the auxiliary variable
fi := uiδi ∈ R that shall satisfy the pattern of inequalities:
S⇒(fi(t), ui(t), δi(t)). (12)
Thus, the SoC dynamics at the generic time t ∈ T reads as
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + bifi(t)− (1− δi(t))µi(t), (13)
The same approach allows to manage the bilinear terms
that appear in the cost function (4). Hence, by defining
gi(t) := ui(t)(1−δci(t)) ∈ R, si(t) := ui(t−1)(1−δci(t)) ∈
R, `i(t) := ui(t)(1− δdi (t)) ∈ R and κi(t) := ui(t− 1)(1−
δdi (t)) ∈ R, subjected to inequalities, for all i ∈ I and t ∈ T ,
S⇒(gi(t), ui(t), 1− δci(t)), (14)
S⇒(si(t), ui(t− 1), 1− δci(t)), (15)
S⇒(`i(t), ui(t), 1− δdi (t)), (16)
S⇒(κi(t), ui(t− 1), 1− δdi (t)), (17)
the cost function (4) reads as (omitting the dependencies),
Ji = c(d(t) + ai(u(t)))`i(t) + ri(t)gi(t)
+ ρ−i (gi(t)− si(t))2 + ρ+i (`i(t)− κi(t))2 . (18)
Notice that via these variables we can rewrite also a(u(t)) =∑
j∈I\{i} `j(t). Let us consider proposition (7), equivalently
rewritten as [ui(t) ≤ 0]∧ [ui(t) ≥ 0] =⇒ [(1− δi(t)) = 1].
Since δci and δ
d
i already satisfy the inequalities in (10) and
(11), for all t ∈ T , the constraint in (7) reads as
S∧(1− δi(t), δci(t), δdi (t)). (19)
Next, by referring to (6), we introduce a binary auxiliary
variable αi, which is equal to 1 when both δi(t−1) = 0 and
δi(t) = 1, 0 otherwise. Hence, αi shall satisfy, for all t ∈ T ,
[αi(t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [(1− δi(t− 1)) = 1] ∧ [δi(t) = 1], which
translates into the pattern of integer linear inequalities
S∧(αi(t), 1− δi(t− 1), δi(t)). (20)
Thus, (6) can be rewritten as a nonlinear equality constraint
αi(t)
(∑hi
h=1 δi(t+ h)− hi
)
= 0. Successively, we intro-
duce a set of variables β(h)i ∈ B such that, for all t ∈ T ,
[β
(h)
i (t) = 1] ⇐⇒ [αi(t) = 1] ∧ [δi(t + h) = 1, ∀h ≤ hi],
which corresponds to the following patterns of inequalities
S∧(β(h)i (t), αi(t), δi(t+ h)), ∀h ≤ hi. (21)
This allows to rewrite the equality constraint in linear form∑hi
h=1β
(h)
i (t)− αi(t)hi = 0. (22)
B. Final mixed-integer-linear model
By rearranging all the inequalities, we obtain the following
mixed-integer aggregative game
∀i ∈ I :

min
ui,xi,...,βi
Ji(ui, gi, si, `i, κi,u−i)
s.t. (5), xi(t) ∈ [0, 1],
(8)–(17), (19)–(22),
ui(t), fi(t), gi(t), si(t) ∈ U(t),
`i(t), κi(t) ∈ U(t), δi(t) ∈ B(t),
δci(t), αi(t), δ
d
i (t) ∈ B, ∀t ∈ T ,
β
(h)
i (t) ∈ B, ∀h ≤ hi,∀t ∈ T .
(23)
The coupling constraints in (8)–(9), as well as the cost
function, depend on the aggregate behavior of the fleet of
PEVs. By defining zi := col(ui, xi, . . . , βi) ∈ Rni and z :=
col((zi)i∈I) ∈ Rn, n :=
∑
i∈I ni, as the vectors stacking
local and collective mixed-integer variables, respectively, we
have, for some suitable matrix A and vector b,
∀i ∈ I : min
zi
Ji(zi, z−i) s.t. Az ≤ b. (24)
IV. PEVS CHARGE COORDINATION AS A GENERALIZED
MIXED-INTEGER POTENTIAL GAME
Our aim is now to design suitable sequences of decisions
that guarantee to each PEV an effective, economic, possibly
profitable, usage of the electrical distribution network, while
satisfying both the intrinsic limitations of the charging station
itself, and by the presence of the other vehicles. We propose
to achieve such a trade-off by formalizing the charge coordi-
nation of the set of PEVs as a MI-GPG [14], an instance of
the Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) [20].
A. Potential game setup
First, we identify the player set with I, and we define
the feasible set of each player, i.e., Zi(z−i) := {zi ∈ Rni |
A(zi, z−i) ≤ b}, and Z := {z ∈ Rn | Az ≤ b}. Next,
we introduce the mixed-integer best response mapping for
player i, given the strategies of the other players z−i:
z?i (z−i) := argmin
zi
Ji(zi, z−i) s.t. (zi, z−i) ∈ Z. (25)
Hence, in the proposed game Γ := (I, {Ji}i∈I , {Zi}i∈I),
we are interested in the following notion of equilibrium.
Definition 1 (ε-Mixed-Integer Nash equilibrium): Let
ε > 0. z∗ ∈ Z is an ε-Mixed-Integer Nash Equilibrium
(ε-MINE) of the game Γ in (25) if, for all i ∈ I,
Ji(z
∗
i , z
∗
−i) ≤ inf
zi∈Zi(z∗−i)
Ji(zi, z
∗
−i) + ε. 
We consider here potential games characterized by the
existence of an exact potential function, defined next.
Definition 2: A continuous function P : Rn → R is an
exact potential function for the game Γ in (25) if, for all
i ∈ I, for all z−i, and for all zi, yi ∈ Zi(z−i),
P (zi, z−i)− P (yi, z−i) = Ji(zi, z−i)− Ji(yi, z−i). 
Now, let us consider the cost function in (18) defined for
all t ∈ T . Due to the particular structure of the cost of the
acquired energy, in compact form it reads as
Ji(zi, z−i) = φi(zi) +
∑
j∈I\{i} ωij(zi, zj), (26)
where φi(zi) := z>i Qizi + q
>
i zi, for some suitable positive
semi-definite matrix Qi ∈ Rni×ni and vector qi ∈ Rni , while
ωij(zi, zj) := z
>
j
[
0 0 0
0 c I 0
0 0 0
]
zi = c `
>
j `i.
Theorem 1: The game Γ in (25) is an MI-GPG with exact
potential function
P (z) :=
∑
i∈I
(
φi(zi) +
∑
j∈I,j<i
ωij(zi, zj)
)
. (27)

Proof: The proof replicates the one in [21, Prop. 2].
To conclude, we recall that the set of ε-approximated
minimum over Z of P corresponds to a subset of the ε-
MINE of the game [22, Th. 2].
B. Semi-decentralized solution algorithm
To compute a solution to (24), each player requires the
aggregate information over the whole horizon T , i.e., the
PEVs demand of energy ai(u) := col((ai(u(t)))t∈T ), or,
equivalently, the price associated to such demand
pi(u) := c(d+ ai(u)), (28)
Fig. 1: Semi-decentralized implementation of Algorithm 1,
where z+i := zi(k + 1).
Algorithm 1: Sequential best-response
Initialization: Choose z(0) ∈ Z , set k := 0
while z(k) is not an ε-MINE do
AG do
Chooses i := i(k) ∈ I
Sets pi(u(k)) as in (28), e(δ(k)) as in (29)
Sends pi(u(k)), e(δ(k)) to i
end
Player i do
Compute z∗i (k) ∈ z?i (k) as in (25)
if Ji(zi(k), pi(u(k)))− Ji(z∗i (k), pi(u(k))) ≥ ε
zi(k + 1) := z
∗
i (k)
else
zi(k + 1) := zi(k)
end
end
AG collects zi(k + 1)
Set zj(k + 1) := zj(k) ∀j 6= i, k := k + 1
end
with d := col((d(t))t∈T ), and the number of available
charging points at the charging station, i.e.,
e(δ) := v1T −
(
1>N ⊗ IT
)
δ, (29)
where δ := col((δi)i∈I). Specifically, while the number of
available charging points e(δ) reflects the coupling constraint
in (9), the price of energy pi(u) affects both the constraints
and the cost function in (26), which can be equivalently
expressed as function of zi and pi(u).
In this context, it seems unrealistic or, at least, impractical
to assume full communication among all the potential users
of the same charging station, over the same horizon T .
Therefore, to compute an ε-MINE, we propose a semi-
decentralized implementation of the sequential best-response
method, summarized in Algorithm 1, that includes an ag-
gregator AG, whose role is played by the charging station,
within the communication pattern. According to [1], we
assume the driving patterns of each PEV to be known by
the AG. As shown in the scheme in Fig. 1, at each iteration
k, the aggregator AG chooses the next agent taking part
in the game, communicating the price of energy and the
number of available charging points. With this information,
the selected agent computes a best response and decides to
change strategy only if it leads to an (at least) ε-improvement
in terms of minimization of its cost function. Finally, AG
collects the decision of such agent, while the remaining part
of players keeps its strategy unchanged.
Corollary 1: Let ε > 0 and assume that, in Algorithm 1,
there exists K > 0 such that j ∈ {i(k), i(k + 1), . . . , i(k +
K)} for all j ∈ I and k ≥ 0. Algorithm 1 computes an
ε-MINE, z∗ ∈ Z , of the game Γ in (25). 
Proof: In view of Theorem 1, the game Γ in (25) is
an MI-GPG. Therefore, by [22, Th. 4], the sequential best-
response based Algorithm 1 converges to an ε-MINE.
TABLE I: Simulation parameters
Name [ ] Description Values
N PEVs number 6
T Time intervals in 24h 48
u [kWh] Energy exchanged per interval [−7.5, 7.5]
η Battery efficiency 0.85
Ci [kWh] Battery capacity [40, 75]
x0 Initial SoC of battery 0.23
xref Ref. battery SoC [0.2, 0.85]
c [e/kWh] Energy cost 1.09× 10−3
r¯ [e/kWh] Constant reward 1.23× 10−3
ρ+ (ρ−) [e/kWh2] Degradation cost 1(0.5)× 10−3
d [kWh] Grid power capacity 45
h Min. consecutive v2g slots 5
v Max. connected PEVs 5
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we show numerical results obtained by
solving the MI-GPG in (25) with parameter values specified
in Tab. I (see [5], [13], [23]) and reward function r(t) chosen
proportional to the nominal demand and the energy generated
by the vehicles, i.e., r(t) := r(
∑
j∈I\{i} u
−
j (t)+d(t)), where
d(t) corresponds to a typical daily demand curve [13], and
u−j (t) defined analogously to u
+
j (t).
For a subset of PEVs, we show in Fig. 2 that the SoC
xi(t), as well as the scheduling variable δi(t), satisfy the
constraints on the required SoC xrefi (t) (5) and on the number
hi of plugged-in consecutive intervals (6). In Fig. 3, note that
the peak value of d(t) exceeds the maximum capacity d at
t = 19 h. Consequently, the constraint (8) forces some of the
vehicles to discharge during this time period, showing the so-
called “valley filling” phenomenon. Finally, Fig. 4 shows the
value of the potential function P (z) and the convergence of
the algorithm after approximately 25 iterations.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
A mixed-integer aggregative game can efficiently solve the
charge scheduling coordination of a fleet of PEVs, each one
modeled as a system of mixed-logical-dynamical systems.
Discrete decision variables, as well as logical propositions,
allow to catch the different interests of each PEV and the
heterogeneous interactions between both the set of vehicles
itself and the charging station. By playing the role of central
aggregator, the charging station is key in computing an
(approximated) equilibrium of the associated generalized
potential game in a semi-decentralized fashion. In fact, the
specific sequence of activation of the PEVs highly influences
both the outcome of the game and the speed of convergence.
The analysis of this phenomenon is left to future works, as
well as the generalization in the case of multiple charging
stations, i.e., possible multiple central aggregators.
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